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SECURITIES ACTIONS: EQUITABLE DEFENSES AND THE
GOOD FAITH DEFENSE FOR "CONTROLLING PERSONS"
INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,2 it did not specifically indicate what effect the
statutory scheme should have upon equitable defenses formerly available in
securities actions. Nonetheless, Congress seemed to have dealt with the
question indirectly. Each Act includes a section manifesting a general intent
to preserve prior law, providing in part: "The rights and remedies provided
by this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity."'3 In addition, each "express
liability' 4 section of both Acts provides that "any person... may [sue], either
at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction .... 5, Moreover,
the Supreme Court has observed that "the [1933] Act as a whole indicates an
intention to establish a statutory right which the litigant may enforce ... by
such legal or equitable actions or procedures as would normally be available to
him. " 6
Notwithstanding these general references, certain inconsistencies exist. For
example, both Acts specifically provide a good faith defense for "controlling
persons," without reference to the applicability of previously settled case law
and the common law of agency. 7 Other sections specifically incorporate
certain equitable principles even though these doctrines probably would have
been applied by the courts as settled law without direction from Congress.8
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
2. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
3. Securities Act of 1933 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1970); accord, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
4. These are sections expressly providing a private cause of action, in contrast with sections
under which the courts have implied such a right. See note 9 infra.
5. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970) (emphasis added); accord,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
6. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1940) (emphasis added). In
the same vein, one jurist has noted that section 29(b) of the 1934 Act "was a legislative direction
to apply common-law principles ... enacted at a time when it seemed much more likely than it
might now that courts would fail to do this without explicit legislative instruction." Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971)
(Friendly, J., dissenting). The Acts' language is not complex and Congress seems to have feared
no confusion over the Acts' intentionally broad provisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 1838 (Conference
Report), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-42 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1934);
S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-13 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11-26
(1933); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-6 (1933).
7. See notes 151-87 infra and accompanying text. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants
in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnifica-
tion, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597 (1972).
8. One perplexing section is § 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), which specifically
incorporates the "federal" or "equitable" tolling doctrine-providing that a plaintiff's reasonable
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Although such specific incorporation of the availability of a common law
doctrine may be merely an excess of caution, any failure to make such
provision prompts the argument that when a statute is specific, that which is
not included--e.g., other equitable principles-is deemed excluded. Due to
the ambiguity of these sections, federal courts have reached inconsistent
results as to whether certain equitable defenses should be permitted.
In interpreting the securities laws, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
pointed to the imprecision of the Acts' language and has urged flexibility in
the exercise of equitable discretion by lower courts. For example, lower courts
have implied private rights of action based upon the Supreme Court's
recognition that the investor protection function of some sections of the Acts
could not be realized without private suits, 9 and despite Congress' specific
provision that private actions were only available under certain sections. 10 In
a similar vein, the Court has distinguished the structure and phrasing of the
1934 Act from other more precise statutes. 11 Notwithstanding its earlier
failure to discover fraud or other injury will toll the statute of limitations-a well established
common law rule. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874); see Hochfelder v.
Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1119 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S.
Mar. 30, 1976) (No. 74-1042); Schilleci v. Guaranty Say. Life Ins. Co., 367 F. Supp. 903, 904 (N.D.
Ala. 1973); G. Clark, Equity § 306 (1954). Compounding the inconsistency, the Acts are very specific
in other instanices when the intent was to alter common law presumptions, e.g., concerning punitive
damages, waiver, and illegality of contracts. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 28(a), 29(a)-(b),
15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(a), cc(a)-(b) (1970).
9. The Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), permitted a shareholder to bring
an action against corporate management alleging violation of proxy solicitation provisions under
Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), a section without provision for such
private actions. Considerations cited by the Court were (a) that private actions are an
effective way of enforcing the Acts, and (b) that federal courts have power to create federal
common law. 377 U.S. at 432-34. See generally Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private
Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the
Judiciary?, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 441 (1974).
10. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); Securities Act of
1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970). Moreover, judicial improvisation is a necessary
consequence of the creation of implied actions. In the absence of legislative guidance the courts
must establish their elements and determine the availability of defenses. See generally SEC v.
National Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 469-72 (1969) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. Law. 167 (Special Issue
1974).
11. The Court, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970), approved an
award of attorneys' fees despite the absence of statutory iuthority, and even though Congress had
provided in the 1934 Act that "no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the
provisions of this chapter shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of his actual damages on
account of the act complained of." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). The Court distinguished its holding
in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), barring such an
award in a Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970)) case. It noted that in the Lanham Act,
Congress had "meticulously detailed" what remedies should be available to plaintiffs so that the
refusal to augment these provisions in Fleischmann was proper. However, the Court concluded,
"[bly contrast, we cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to
circumscribe the courts' power to grant appropriate remedies." 396 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted);
cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("It is .. .proper that we
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admonition in a trademark case that if the statute in question expressly
provides a remedy "other remedies should not readily be implied," 12 the Court
has found that the 1934 Act's clearly announced purpose of affording protec-
tion to the investing public' 3 requires "resolving doubts in favor of those the
statute [was] designed to protect. .... ",14 Lower courts have relied upon this
general emphasis on flexibility as well as their own sense of equity in
determining the applicability of equitable principles formerly available to
defendants in securities actions.
However, some lower courts, in ruling -on the admissibility of these
defenses, have relied upon a Supreme Court case that did not deal with the
securities acts. In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,15
the Court held that the defense of in pari delicto 16 was "not to be recognized
as a defense to an antitrust action."'1 7 The Court's opinion was based upon the
conviction that the strong public policy in favor of competition is "best served
by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter
anyone contemplating. . . violation of the antitrust laws."' 8 In addition, the
Court noted in farther ranging dictum that "[w]e have often indicated the
inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a
private suit serves important public purposes."' 9 Reliance upon this reasoning
and dictum has resulted in limitation or exclusion of equitable defenses in
some securities cases. 20
consider... policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect
to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance." [construing § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)D.
12. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 2, 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, j(b) (1970).
14. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970); see SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Jnc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (the Acts must be construed "not technicany...
but flexibly'). Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Mills, believed the Fleischmann holding should
govern the 1934 Act: "The courts are interpreters, not creators, of legal rights to recover and if
there is a need for recovery of attorneys' fees to effectuate the policies of the Act here involved,
that need should . . . be met by Congress, not by this Court." 396 U.S. at 397. The tendency to
resolve doubts in favor of investors in securities actions may be traced at least to A.C. Frost &
Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43-44 (1941). See, e.g., Can-Am Petroleum Co.
v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964); Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F.
Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 223 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294
F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
16. Generally, a plaintiff "in equal fault" in the same transaction on which he sues is denied
relief. See the definition and discussion at note 38 infra and accompanying text.
17. 392 U.S. at 140.
18. Id. at 139.
19. Id. at 138. It is noteworthy that the Court supported this broad statement by citing only
two cases, both of which involved antitrust matters. Id. at 137-39. Moreover, in one of these,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951), plaintiff's wrongdo-
ing consisted of a prior, unrelated conspiracy with third parties--a situation in which in pari
delicto traditionally would not apply as a defense. See note 38 infra.
20. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
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The Supreme Court has not faced squarely the question whether common
law or equitable defenses may be raised in either express or implied securities
actions. 21 The Court has, however, dealt with an analogous question-the
availability of equitable relief. It would seem that equitable relief in securities
actions should be available upon the traditional showing of inadequate
remedy at law or irreparable harm. 22 However, the lower courts often have
not adhered to these standards. Instead, they have imposed less stringent
requirements in order to insure the broadest possible scope of enforcement of
the securities laws. 23 This was due in part to the Supreme Court's language in
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 24 which held that "fraud," as
used in the securities acts, was not the equivalent of common law fraud which
required a plaintiff to prove both intent and injury. The Court stated that it
did not think that the Acts merely codified the common law. Even if this were
the case, however, the Court noted that the remedial purpose of the Acts
would require that they be construed "not technically . . . but flexibly" and
such a construction would lead to the same result-that the plaintiff need not
show the traditional common law elements. 25 Moreover, the Court noted
that the relief sought was merely the "mild prophylactic" of injunction to
compel disclosure by defendant. 26 With that observation, the Court seemingly
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 89-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969)
(although barring plaintiff's claim, the court declined to rule that he was in pari delicto citing
Perma Life approvingly and seemingly basing its holding on enforcement considerations). See also
Bell, How To Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity of Common Law Defenses to Private
Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1970).
21. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), the Court
concluded its opinion with the oblique statement: "All defenses except our ruling on § 10(b) will
be open on remand." Id. at 14.
22. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940); see Securities Act of
1933 §§ 11(a), 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771 (1970); text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
23. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970);
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146, 1152-54 (D. Nev, 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); cf. Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969). In
Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1974), the court of appeals reversed the trial court
which had held that rescission was unavailable to a fraud victim against a defrauder not In
privity and stated: "[W]e believe that the district court took too narrow a view of its powers as a
court of equity . . . ." Finally, in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 813 (2d
Cir. 1975), the court held that agency principles applied to a broker's employee in a rescission
action, although refusing to intimate a view on such a case if damages had been sought.
It should be noted, however, that a statutory right to rescission is provided by, e.g., Securities
Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970): a "person purchasing . . . may sue either at law or In
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security." Therefore it seems that the
availability of rescission as an equitable remedy should not be as open to question as are the
availability of non-statutory defenses or private injunctions.
24. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
25. Id. at 195.
26. Id. at 193.
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dismissed the traditional view of injunction as an extraordinary remedy
that should be limited because of its comparatively drastic effect on a
defendant's activities. While the injunction in Capital Gains arguably was
only a "mild" imposition on defendant, the case's broadly phrased presump-
tion in favor of investors has often been relied upon-even to justify diluting
or ignoring the Acts' clear language in certain instances in order to aid
plaintiffs. 27
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,28 however, the Supreme Court
recently addressed the issue of equitable relief in securities actions and
concluded that a traditional view of equitable relief, at least in the circum-
stances of that case, would be more appropriate. In Mosinee, the petitioner
had acquired in excess of five percent of respondent's stock but did not file a
schedule 13D notice of his holdings in the time required by the Williams
Act.29 The petitioner asserted that he was ignorant of the requirement but
had no plan, during the period of the violation, to attempt to acquire control
of Mosinee. 30 The Court found that respondent suffered no harm because of
petitioner's technical default, and consequently that the injunction against
petitioner was improvidently granted. 3 1 The Court reaffirmed the traditional
requirement that equitable relief must be predicated upon a showing of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff. It had been held frequently that some lesser
showing would suffice, especially in the case of SEC actions. 32
27. One example is the interpretation of sections in both Acts that appear to forbid any award
in excess of "actual damages." See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1970); Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(e), (g), 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), (g), 771 (1970). Some cases
have refused to hold that such language bars the availability of punitive damages through the
assertion of a pendent state claim. See Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1337 (10th Cir. 1972); In
re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 394 (S.D.N.Y 1973); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum), modified on other grounds,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). Contra, Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1193
(N.D. Ill. 1970), appeal dismissed, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972). Similarly, the Supreme Court in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), affirmed an award of attorneys' fees as
permissible in the trial court's discretion, although the Acts only authorized such awards in
actions under certain sections. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1970). See also Young v. Taylor, supra, at 1337 (attorneys' fees available through pendent state
law claim). The Supreme Court has also sanctioned the application of a liberal common law
measure of general damages, ruling that a defrauded seller's damages should be the difference
between the price received and the actual value "except for the situation where the defendant
received more than the seller's actual loss. In the latter case damages are the amount of the
defendant's profit." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); see SEC v.
Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 416-17 (3d
Cir. 1974); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
28. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
30. 422 U.S. at 55 & n.4, 60-62.
31. Id. at 57-61.
32. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); Comment, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The
Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 Colum. J. Law & Social Prob. 328, 336, 337-40 (1974). The cases
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The language of Mosinee thus discounts somewhat the statutory presump-
tion in favor of securities plaintiffs. The holding, however, may be cir-
cumscribed by the evident impatience of the Supreme Court with suits
brought on the basis of technical violations 33 and a growing sensitivity of the
courts to the fact that tender offers, like that contemplated by petitioner,
3 4
may be unjustly and irreparably harmed by the premature granting of
injunctions. 35 Furthermore, Mosinee may be distinguished by the Court's
repeated stress upon petitioner's good faith which seemingly provided him a
defense based on equity when the statute did not.
36
demonstrate "a pattern of judicial deference ...to the wishes of the Commission" in granting
injunctions. Id. at 353.
SEC actions for injunctions are governed by 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(e) (1970), each providing
in essence: "Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation . . . it may In Its
discretion, bring an action... to enjoin... and upon a proper showing ... injunction... shall
be granted . . . ." One interpretation of this language is that "a proper showing" is made when "It
shall appear to the Commission," i.e., a prima facie case. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.,
515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (the SEC injunction is a "creature of statute" not subject to prior
standards); SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum); SEC v. Jones, 85 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1936) (per curiam); cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 492 F.2d 136, 140 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) ("Private parties may maintain
an action to enjoin anticipated or continuing violations of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 though they
could not sue for damages."); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950 (1970); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule l0b-5, 53 Cornell L. Rev.
684, 694-97 (1968).
An opposing interpretation which appears more plausible from the face of the statute is that
the injunction may be sought when it "appears to the Commission" but should only be granted
"upon a proper showing," i.e., the showing of irreparable harm usually required "at law or in
equity in a court of competent jurisdiction." See, e.g., Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 1974); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113,
1117-18 (E.D. Mo. 1971). The formulation of this traditional rule outside the realm of securities
cases is found in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959); United States
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
33. 422 U.S. at 55-56. Recent cases have dismissed such claims more frequently. See, e.g.,
Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 516 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); Daley v.
Capitol Bank & Trust Co., 506 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F.
Supp. 1146, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 5.16 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975) (complaint failed to state a
cause of action where it alleged defendant failed to file schedule 13D but contained no allegation
of harm to plaintiff). It is noteworthy that the Court has suggested in a rule 10b-5 case that if It
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs the effect might be "to encourage nuisance or 'strike' suits." Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975). A presumption against plaintiffs in
derivative suits gives rise to the latter expression. Hence to compare such cases to any section
10(b) action is to progress far from mechanical presumptions favoring securities plaintiffs.
34. 422 U.S. at 55.
35. See, e.g., Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113, 1118-19 (E.D. Mo. 1971); cf.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1975), noted in 43 Fordham L. Rev. 484, 492 (1974); Note, The Courts and the
Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 991 (1973).
36. Williams Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). The Supreme Court reinstated the
district court's judgment that petitioner's "lack of bad faith and the absence of damage to
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Apart from the Mosinee analogy, federal courts today must draw from an
inconsistent body of precedent in ruling on the availability of defenses in
securities actions. This Comment will analyze decisions reached by the lower
courts facing this question to determine whether they are in accord with
apparent congressional intent. In addition, consideration will be given to the
non-statutory equitable defenses relating to plaintiffs' participation in viola-
tions (in pan delicto, unclean hands and illegality), to plaintiffs' acquiescence
in violations (laches, estoppel and waiver), and to the statutory defense of
good faith for "controlling persons."
I. DEFENSE OF PLAINTIFFS' PARTICIPATION
A. In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands
The Court's statement in Perma Life that the defense of in pari delicto is
"not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action"37 need not be taken
literally in view of the opinion as a whole. The defense properly comes into
play only when fault is found to be relatively equal, 38 and the Court in Pema
respondent made this 'a particularly inappropriate occasion to fashion equitable relief... .' "422
U.S. at 56. Indeed, Judge Pell, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit majority opinion, had
written: "We are ... confronting the matter of remedy and indeed whether any remedy is...
needed." 500 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1974). Similarly, while the Court has emphasized the
literal provisions of § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (see Blau v. Lehman, 368
U.S. 403, 409-14 (1962); cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975)
(dictum)), it has also held that insiders' short-swing profits under the section are not necessarily
violations, despite the section's apparent strict liability, if the defendant insider in fact lacked the
potential for "speculative abuse." In such a case, no real harm could have been suffered by
plaintiffs. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594-95 (1973); cf.
Provident Secs. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 604 (1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. S0S
(1976).
37. 392 U.S. at 140.
38. Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory
Schemes, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 572, 577 (1972). In pari delicto ('in equal fault') is generally used
interchangeably with "unclean hands" to denote unfair or inequitable, although not necessarily
illegal, conduct by an applicant for equitable relief. Many courts require that the conduct occur in
the same transaction from which the applicant's right arises. Such conduct will cause a court of
equity to deny the requested relief. 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 403 (Sth ed. 1941)
[hereinafter cited as Pomeroy]; see D. Dobbs, Remedies § 2.4, at 45-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Dobbs]. The defense also is available in actions at law involving illegal transactions, depending
upon the parties' relationship, the seriousness and relevance of plaintiffs wrong, and enforcement
considerations. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1535, 1536, at 821-26 & n.23 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Corbin]. Furthermore, it is said that where the fault is truly equal, no recovery even at law is
permitted. In pari deicto, however, often appears as an "exception" or a qualifier to "unclean
hands." Where one party is not equally culpable and some important public policy-particularly
one announced by statute-is advanced by permitting that party to have relief, then even a court
of equity may ignore his improper conduct. 6A Corbin, supra, § 1540 at 833-35; 2 Pomeroy,
supra, § 403, at 137; 14 S. Williston, Contracts § 1631A, at 46-47 (3d ed. 1972); see 6A Corbin
§ 1465, at 557. The basis of the Perma Life decision fits precisely within the last exception;
"public policy in favor of competition" is so strong that the moral worth of plaintiffs is
disregarded--especially since the private antitrust action is a "bulwark of antitrust enforcement."
392 U.S. at 139.
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Life found that the plaintiff franchisees who brought suit to nullify the
franchises had been coerced into antitrust violations by their franchisor. As
the plurality opinion noted, the illegal agreement was virtually a contract of
adhesion, not negotiated or chosen by the plaintiffs but rather "thrust upon"
them, 39 and their intent in signing was not equivalent to defendant's anticom-
petitive purpose. Hence, had the Court cast its opinion in terms of the precise
application of the traditional in pari delicto rule, it would not have reached a
different result. Indeed, the doctrine mandates that plaintiffs in Perma Life
have relief for two reasons: their degree of fault and participation were less
than defendant's, and secondly, had they been more nearly equal, the strong
public policy favoring private actions as part of the regulatory scheme might
still, in this case, override an in pari delicto defense.40 Finally, the Perma Life
Court added the caveat: "We need not decide... whether... truly complete
involvement and participation. . . could ever be a basis, wholly apart from
the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action, for in the
present case [such a] picture ... is utterly refuted by the record." 4 1 The Court
has yet to elaborate on the meaning of "complete involvement and participa-
tion." However, this statement of the Court, as well as statements in the
concurring opinions, 42 manifest a recognition that a plaintiff who shares
substantially equal fault may be barred. 43 Consequently, Perma Life should
not foreclose a defendant's assertion of in pari delicto in a securities action
where the fault is nearly equal, notwithstanding the public policy favoring
private enforcement. While determining equality of fault may be difficult, 44
the fair results which the defense produces justify its continued availability. 45
39. 392 U.S. at 139-42.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. 392 U.S. at 140. In addition, the Court stated that "we cannot accept the Court of
Appeals' idea that courts have power to undermine the antitrust acts by denying recovery to
injured parties merely because they have participated to the extent of utilizing illegal arrange-
ments formulated and carried out by others." Id. at 139.
42. Id. at 143-44, 147 (White, J., concurring); id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring); Id. at
148-51 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 153-56 (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
43. Indeed, despite the Perma Life decision, some courts have concluded that the defense
remains available in antitrust cases. See Note, Rethinking In Pari Delicto: An Antitrust Policy
Analysis, 3 Fla. St. L. Rev. 360, 361-62, 369-72 (1975).
44. "[T]he amorphous quality of 'equal fault' renders uniform application Impossible."
Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60
Calif. L. Rev. 572, 576 (1972). The only general rule that may be stated is that a plaintiff's mere
knowledge of defendant's. securities violations without more is never a bar-at least absent
circumstances amounting to laches or estoppel. See A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines
Corp., 312 U.S. 38 (1941); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941); notes 89,
129-48 infra and accompanying text.
45. It should be unnecessary for the defendant to resort to one dubious argument which has
been advanced, namely that securities cases should be held to be beyond the scope of Perma Life
simply because the public policy favoring truth in securities dealings is not as strong a policy as
that favoring business competition. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703-05 (5th Cir.
1969).
SECURITIES DEFENSES
Once the theoretical availability of the defense has been established, the
courts' inquiry usually has been twofold: will the defense in the given case
disserve the statutory purpose of investor protection, and how guilty is each
party?4 6 It has been argued that these questions should be answered in
sequence so that an affirmative answer to the first would excuse any inequita-
ble conduct on the part of the plaintiff.47 The courts, however, appear to
consider them concurrently in most cases. The effect of this approach has
been to achieve more equitable results than when one broad policy rule is
applied. When a court balances the equities rather than adhering to the broad
policy of investor protection, neither party is favored. A balancing of the
equities thus serves as a deterrent to prospective violations by plaintiffs that
might otherwise be disregarded under the investor protection policy. How-
ever, the results in most margin violation cases and some inside information
cases, where primary emphasis was placed on broad policy arguments rather
than on the equities, have seemed to encourage rather than deter calculated
violations of the Acts.
B. Margin Violations
Sections 7 and 8 of the 1934 Act4 8 forbid the extension of credit beyond
specified limits for stock purchases. 49 The legislative history of these sections
provides the clearest statement of legislative purpose and the plainest designa-
tion of the class to be protected."0 Yet they have occasioned the most
acrimonious dissension in the courts regarding the availability of in pari
delicto. Although this dissension culminated in congressional amendment of
these sections in 1970,51 the conclusions reached by the courts prior to
amendment are instructive because they illustrate problems which still arise
under other sections.
Congress originally had intended the imposition of margin requirements "to
prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash situation,"5S2 referring to overinflation of
stock prices by speculative purchases financed largely by unsecured credit. Its
46. See Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory
Schemes, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 572, 594-95 (1972); cf. Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and
Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule lOb-S: Deterrence and
Equity in Balance, 73 Yale L.J. 1477, 1490 (1964).
47. See Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory
Schemes, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 572, 584 (1972); cf. Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel and
Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5: Deterrence and
Equity in Balance, 73 Yale L.J. 1477, 1484-87 (1964).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, h (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78h (Supp. 1976).
49. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220-21 (1975).
50. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970). Regulation X, which was established pursuant to this
amendment, forbids the acceptance of credit in amounts not allowed, under section 7(c) and
Regulations T and U, to be extended by lenders. See 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1975). See generally
Comment, Civil Liability for Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f) and Regulation X, 43
Fordham L. Rev. 93 (1974); Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender MAargin Violation Disputes,
57 IMinn. L. Rev. 208 (1972).
52. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
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express purpose was to protect the economy from excessive speculation.
Protection of individual investors was specifically disclaimed as a goal of the
sponsors, although it was recognized as a "by-product. '- 3 By the terms of the
statute, the violation was committed only by the lender. Notwithstanding the
fact that the benefit of the violation generally inured to the borrower, his role
in procuring the violation was ignored in the original Act. The usual result
has been for the lender to forfeit all or part of the improper loan54-although
the courts often expressed reluctance in reaching that result. In Avery v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,55 defendant broker, at the request of
plaintiff customer, effected a short sale of certain stock. The margin regula-
tions required that plaintiff, within five days, deposit with the broker sixty-
five percent of the cost of the shares to be delivered. After plaintiff failed to do
so, although she did have approximately sixty-one percent of the total in her
account, she persuaded the defendant to delay several additional days rather
than cancel the sale. When defendant completed the short sale, the price of
the shares had risen and a large loss resulted, which defendant accordingly
charged to plaintiff's account. Plaintiff then sued to rescind the sale and to
recover the amount of the loss, on the ground that defendant had violated the
margin requirements. She pointed out that, had the broker complied with the
regulations, the sale at a loss would not have been consummated. The court's
response illustrated the problem which the statute presented:
The Court is disturbed by the entire transaction. It appears that a knowledgeable
customer experienced in the requirements and functions of the Exchange authorized a
short sale of a considerable quantity of stock by one of the world's largest stockbrokers
and then later repudiated the sale when she saw it was going poorly. It seems that both
the plaintiff and the defendant were aware that the margin requirements were not met
within the requisite five days. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff promised to
supply the money to meet the margin requirements ...and that because of these
representations the defendant did not meet the[se] requirements by liquidating.
The Court will not entertain a cacophony of blame .... [T]he ultimate responsibil-
ity must be placed somewhere and Congress has indicated that it is with the brokers
... .The Court deplores this type of alleged investor behavior and were not the
mandate of Congress so unequivocal and the public policy considerations so strong, the
Court might reach a substantially different decision than the one it does.5
6
Notwithstanding the statute's "unequivocal" mandate, however, the Second
and Sixth Circuits exercised their equitable discretion to avoid unconscionable
benefit to borrowers where it was shown that fraud was practiced upon the
53. Id.
54. E.g., Daley v. Capitol Bank & Trust Co., 506 F.2d 1375 (1st Cir. 1974); Grove v. First
Nat'l Bank, 489 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1973); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.
Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971) (mem.). Plaintiff's actions have been either claims for cancellation of the
debt or claims for damages representing the decline in value of their accounts preceding the
broker's eventual selling out of the over-margined securities.
55. 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971) (mem.).
56. Id. at 678, 681 (emphasis added) (granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
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lender. In Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, S7 the Second Circuit affirmed
a denial of relief to either party where plaintiff borrower was himself a broker
conversant with the margin rules, and the lending bank plainly had not met
its burden of ascertaining the purpose of the loan. In Spoon v. Walston &
Co.,5 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's award of one-half of plaintiff
borrower's actual damages based on equitable principles, emphasizing its
" 'conclusion that neither party's statement of facts is true.' ,,9 These deci-
sions recognized that the statute in its pre-1970 form encouraged rather than
deterred violations, and apparently concluded that it was the courts' obliga-
tion to fashion relief which might discourage such activity even though the
courts were powerless to change the substantive rule of law. 60
Nonetheless, courts have held that even in a case of fraud on the part of the
plaintiff borrower, the lender's violations, although innocent and technical,
must be punished. 61 If violations are to be deterred, however, such an
inelastic approach should not be taken. 62
57. 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 904 (1969); see Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (held a triable
issue).
58. 345 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
59. 478 F.2d at 247. The district court in Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971) (mem.), indicated earlier that it would have followed this
reasoning had any facts suggesting fraud or deception been presented to it. Id. at 680.
60. Congress' long delay in solving the problem in margin cases, which seemed a gross
injustice to most courts which considered it, may be cited as one good reason for judicial
adaptation, as typified by Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). See Spoon v. Walston
& Co., 345 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973); cf.
Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court
recently adverted in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), to the view
that congressional failure to react to a given judicial interpretation "argues significantly in favor
of" that interpretation. Id. at 733. But congressional inaction in these cases was inconclusive,
since no consistent interpretation had emerged.
61. See, e.g., Grove v. First Nat'l Bank, 489 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1974). Compare to Avery
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971) (mer.) the
observation of the Sixth Circuit, quoting the trial court, in Goldman v. Bank of the Common-
wealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972), that plaintiff presented "a sorry spectacle" and "[%as not a
credible witness]. ... 'He impressed this Court as being very smooth and very glib.' "Id. at 441,
444. At least one court has adhered to this rule denying the defense where plaintiff merely
persuaded, rather then deceived, the lender. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). Lenders' assertions of innocence are seldom
successful. The regulations penalize overextensions of credit regardless of any claimed error or
lack of wilfulness unless the improper loan is the result of mere "mechanical mistake." Regulation
T, 12 C.F.R § 220.6(k) (1975); see Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 36S, 371 (ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
62. Adopting an enforcement standard in securities actions, see, e.g., Comment, The Demise
of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 572, S79
(1972), because of its inflexible approach, cannot account for the equities in each case. Indeed
courts do not agree on how to apply the enforcement standard. See notes 69-73 infra and
accompanying text.
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As Judge Friendly noted in his dissent in Pearlstein v. Scudder & Ger-
man, 
63
[a]ny deterrent effect of threatened liability on the broker may well be more than
offset by the inducement to violations inherent in the prospect of a free ride for the
customer who, under the majority's view, is placed in the enviable position of
"heads-I-win tails-you-lose. .. ."
. .Equity would leave the loss where it lies. 64
This criticism seems applicable to the former statute as well as to the holding
of the case.
65
The 1970 amendment of the margin provisions66 makes it illegal for
borrowers to accept what it had always been illegal for lenders to provide,
thereby ending the borrowers' insulation from liability. The change in the
margin rules has thus eliminated the need for some courts to emphasize their
equitable discretion in order to limit the relief available to the culpable
plaintiff borrowers. But the argument that such discretion should always be
available because of its deterrent effect remains a compelling one. It is
doubtful that a uniform rule favoring one class over another would likely
deter violations more- effectively than the uncertainty which would arise in the
minds of both borrowers and lenders if relief were freely discretionary.
C. Inside Information
While the antagonism of the courts toward the inequity of the margin
statute has not been equalled in cases arising under other sections of the Acts,
a series of suits by tippees alleging fraud by their tippors in violation of
63. 429 F.2d 1136, 1145-49 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). Two other
arguments presented by Judge Friendly were an appeal to the equities of the case-
plaintiff "was no lamb," id. at 1148-and reference to the legislative purpose and its fulfill-
ment: "Occasional and isolated violations" of § 7(c) do not pose such a threat to the economy
as to justify rewarding such a plaintiff. Id. at 1147-48. It is noteworthy that the Second Circuit In
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), recognizing the likelihood of abuse
inherent in these cases, permitted a broker to sue his customer where the broker had alleged a
scheme to purchase securities through him "with the fraudulent intent of paying for the securities
only if their market value had increased by the date payment was due." Id. at 395. The trial court
had granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on the sole ground that
plaintiff was not a buyer. The Second Circuit emphasized that section 10(b) was designed "In the
public interest" as well as "for the protection of investors." Id. at 396.
64. 429 F.2d at 1148, 1149 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
65. Other courts have felt strongly that the section's one-sided approach was unjust. See
Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1972); Serzysko v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 89-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curlam, 409 F.2d
1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970); Regulation X, 12 C.F.R.
§ 224 (1975). Only one case applying Regulation X has been reported to date. Bekken v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 513 F.2d 628 (5th Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 134
(1975) (judgment for broker). Regulation X may be deterring violations or spurring settlement.
See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
[Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,441 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1976).
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section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 67 and rule lOb-568 has presented a strongly
analogous issue. In these cases, the recipients of inside information have sued
the insiders when the information proved to be false and the recipients bought
or sold securities in reliance upon it. Two Fifth Circuit cases, James v.
DuBreui16 9 and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 70 have admitted an in pali delicto
defense against plaintiffs and barred their recovery, although arguably their
participation was not equal. 7 1 The court in both cases focused on the question
that was present but unresolved in the margin cases: apart from the statutory
policy of investor protection, which choice will serve the implicit statutory
purpose of deterring violations?
[1]n view of the substantial deterrent pressures already felt by the corporate insider...
we think it important that tippees, who present the same threat to the investing public
as do insiders themselves, should be offered appropriate discouragement. We conclude
that the better choice is to leave upon persons believing themselves tippees the
restraint arising from the fear of irretrievable loss should they act upon a tip which
proves to have been untrue. Hence the loss must lie where it falls.7"
However, a forceful contrary argument has been made. Since insiders are,
after all, the source of inside information, imposing an additional sanction
against them should help to eradicate the problem.7 3 Both views continue to
coexist, awaiting resolution from the Supreme Court or from Congress. A
preference for either class as a policy matter seems unwvise, however, if the
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.Iob-5 (1975). Corporate insiders and their tippees have a duty to disclose
material non-public information about a corporation when buying or selling its shares. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
69. 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
71. In James, defendant, an insider of a merging bank, persuaded plaintiff to sell defendant
his shares in the bank on the pretext that their value would be enhanced when placed in a
nonexistent "organizers' trust" Plaintiff's suit to rescind for fraud was dismissed because he had
agreed to back-date the transfer documents so that sale to the insider during the merger period
would appear legal under a rule then in effect 500 F.2d at 155-57, 159.
In the earlier Kuehnert case, plaintiff bought stock in defendant corporation on the open
market on the strength of false inside information from its president, knowing that his own
nondisclosure of the information was improper. After losing his investment, he sought damages.
The court dismissed the claim, while noting, however, that "Kuehnert knowing nothing,
concealed nothing, and hence did not defraud his vendors." 412 F.2d at 704. The court
recognized that the one question before it was: "[I]s an impure heart an equivalent [of a wrongful
act, barring relief]?" 412 F.2d at 703. But it concluded that enforcement of the Acts in this case
required an affirmative answer.
72. 412 F.2d at 705.
73. Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (in
pari delicto and unclean hands not admissible); Comment, In Pari Delicto as a Bar to Tippee's
Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: The Concept of "Public Interest" in Trade Regulation Compared, 11
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 257 (1970). This theory has been called disadvantageous from the
standpoint of equity, as well as of enforcement, in that it gives tippees an enforceable warranty of
the worth of inside information. Comment, The Demise of In Pad Delicto in Private Actions
Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 572, 591-92 (1972).
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lesson of the margin cases is recalled: violations are likely to multiply if one
participant in an illegal transaction remains immune from liability.
The striking aspect of the inside information cases as they relate to
equitable defenses generally is the short shrift invariably given the equities of
the parties. It appears that the courts view insider violations as more serious,
wilful, and insidious, and both tippors and tippees as more inherently
undeserving, than those who engage in technical margin violations and other
kinds of fraud.7 4 Far from favoring plaintiffs as members of the protected
class of investors, the Fifth Circuit in James and in Kuehnert referred to each
as a "dupe." s7 5 That their act of buying or selling, once in receipt of inside
information, constituted a part of the same transaction as required by the in
pari delicto doctrine76 seems to be presumed without analysis by the insider
cases permitting the defense.77
D. Other Fraudulent Transactions
In securities cases where the fraud does not concern inside information, the
courts have generally embraced the doctrine of "resolving doubts in favor of
those the statute is designed to protect.17 8 Hence there has been reluctance to
admit the traditional defenses or, if admitted, to find that they are sustained
by the evidence.7 9 However, a recent Fifth Circuit case, Woolfv. S.D. Cohn
74. See notes 48-59 supra, 78-98 infra and accompanying text.
75. 500 F.2d at 160; 412 F.2d at 703. It may be noted on the side of plaintiffs in Kuehnert
and even in James that there is contrary authority, stating that a "gullible" plaintiff participating
in an illegal scheme is more, not less, worthy of relief. 6A Corbin, supra note 38, §§ 1536, 1540
(citing cases).
76. Dobbs, supra note 38, § 2.4, at 46.
77. See, e.g., James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
78. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970); see, e.g., Woolf v. S.D. Cohn &
Co., 521 F.2d 225, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d
371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964).
79. See, e.g., Meyers v. C & M Petroleum Producers, Inc., 476 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 829 (1973); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1106-07 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
However, in Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enterprises, No. 74-2050 (4th Cir., Oct. 20, 1975), the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the availability of the defense, citing James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155
(5th Cir. 1974), and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969), and distinguishing
Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964), see note 89 infra and
accompanying text, but did not discuss the Perma Life or Woolf decisions. No. 74-2050 at 4-5.
However, plaintiffs' violation was egregious in Malamphy. Plaintiffs, real-estate salesmen, were
hired after defendant seller had been enjoined from further sales by the SEC, and were fully
aware of the injunction. Upon defendant's bankruptcy, they sued claiming fraud in the offering
and sale (each had purchased parcels himself as a promotional device). The jury found for the
defendant. Id. at 2-4.
Because of the broad public policy in favor of investor protection, however, some courts have
overstated the law beyond the requirements of the case before them. For example, in Rosen v.
Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), even
though plaintiff was plainly not in pari delicto, Judge Metzner wrote: "The doctrine of in parl
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& Co., 80 announced new standards even more favorable to plaintiffs. In
Woolf, plaintiff buyers sought damages under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act81
from the defendant issuer and its management, alleging inadequate disclosure
of the issuer's financial condition. The court held that the buyers were entitled
to maintain an action for damages,8 2 and discounted defendants' claim that
misrepresentation on the part of plaintiffs-that they were buying for invest-
ment and not resale when in fact they had already arranged for resale-put
them in pari delicto with the issuer. Although plaintiffs' misrepresentation
might well have defeated the defendant issuer's section 4(2) exemption, 83 the
court concluded that it was not a part of defendants' violation of section 10(b)
and that defendants' success would adversely affect the investing public,
whose protection was a primary purpose of the 1934 Act.8 4 Strongly endorsing
the Perma Life rationale of private enforcement, the court reformulated its
test for in pari delicto:
[T]he fault of the parties must be "mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal," and
the plaintiff must be an active, essential, and knowing participant in the unlawful
activity. Moreover, because of the twofold purpose of the implied private rights of
action ... deterrence... and compensation... the degree to which the defendant's
unlawful activity affects the investing public must be given substantial weight in
determining whether to permit interposition of the in pari delicto defense. Thus, even
in a case where the fault of the plaintiff and defendant were relatively equal,
simultaneous and mutual, the court might still reject the defense if it appeared that the
defendant's unlawful activities were of a sort likely to have a substantial impact on the
investing public, and the primary legal responsibility for and ability to control that
impact is with the defendant.8s
The court's emphasis on the impact of a defendant's activities upon the
investing public in Woolf is the strictest test yet proposed for availability of
the defense. There are few activities which do not at least indirectly affect the
investing public.8 6 The Woolf standard avers the importance of deterring
delicto is inapplicable to cases where former officers and directors of a corporation are charged
with participating with others in the perpetration of a fraud against the corporation and its
shareholders." Id. at 96,606.
An additional factor present in most of the reported cases is that plaintiffs, as small investors,
have tended to receive the benefit of the doubt unless defendants vigorously pursue the extent of
plaintiffs' sophistication. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1974)
(plaintiff struck allegation of little or no investment experience after defense sought to discover
her income tax returns).
80. 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1976)
(No. 75-969).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
82. 515 F.2d at 605-06.
83. Id.; see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
84. 515 F.2d at 604-05.
85. Id. at 604.
86. Even in the false inside information cases the Fifth Circuit had "assumed" that the denial
of relief would have no public impact. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir.
1969). The assumption seems unrealistic. Certainly, if in pani delicto were always available,
increased activity by knowledgeable insiders would be likely to displace the market artificially,
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violations and compensating victims of violations of the securities acts,87 but
fails to deal at all with the consequent diminution of deterrence to plaintiffs,
not all of whom may fairly be termed "victims." The final clause of the Woolf
test, regarding primary legal responsibility for compliance, emphasizes the
one-sidedness of the deterrence aspect. It is similar to that of the pre-1970
margin violation cases, which held that liability must ultimately rest upon
those on whom Congress imposed the duty of compliance.8 8 However, the
idea that a full participant in a violation might be immune from liability is
foreign to Perma Life and to settled authority. 89
Nonetheless, Woolf seems correct on its facts, since plaintiff's hands were
not soiled in the same transaction as that from which her right arose, nor was
her conduct equivalent to the issuer's. 90 But the essence of the Woolf
test-barring in pari delicto whenever a court finds that a defendant's
activities have substantial impact beyond the parties91-is an inadequate
guide to the courts now obliged to apply it. It imposes the burdensome
requirement of additional determinations of "substantial impact" and "pri-
mary responsibility." The trial courts are not well equipped to make these
determinations, nor are they certain to rule consistently. Moreover, the test
unduly restricts the courts' traditional equitable discretion which, even under
and insiders' relative immunity from private suit would dramatically affect the availability of
inside information and the amount of unpunished fraud. Notably, the Supreme Court has since
held that liability in securities fraud does not depend upon market effect. Superintendent of Ins,
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-12 (1971). Hence the best view from the deterrence
standpoint is avoidance of the Woolf recommendation, which puts an artificial, rather than an
equitable, limitation upon availability of the defense.
87. 515 F.2d at 604.
88. In Woolf, qualifying for the section 4(2) exemption from registration was the issuer's
burden. Id. at 605.
89. See, e.g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1054 (2d Cir. 1969); Can-Am
Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964); Athas v. Day, 186 F. Supp. 385 (D.
Colo. 1960). Moreover, the idea should have even less application here, where the plaintiff Woolf
was an attorney and an experienced investor; her violations did not appear to be unknowing. 515
F.2d at 597. Although Woolf is correct on its facts since plaintiff's violation was sufficiently
separate from defendant's, such plaintiffs have met with judicial scorn in other pari delicto
cases. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 441, 447 (6th Cir. 1972).
90. 515 F.2d at 604-05; see text accompanying note 84 supra. In a subsequent opinion
denying rehearing, the Woolf court suggested a possible limitation upon the holding by emphasiz-
ing the nature of defendants' violation: "The private action.., arguably occupies an even more
important place in the area of private placements than in other areas of Securities Act
enforcement where activities of an issuer must both be reported to and approved by the S.E.C."
Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d 225, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
91. On petition for rehearing the court rephrased and clarified its test: "[T]he question Is...
whether [plaintiffs' conduct] was equal, simultaneous, and vital to the effectuation of the
fraudulent scheme (as the cooperation of a co-conspirator is vital to . .. a conspiracy); and
whether the remedial purposes of the securities laws will be furthered more by allowing the
defense than by disallowing it." 521 F.2d at 228. The language "vital to the effectuation" is not
contrary to the usual standard for determining what constitutes participation. But the second part
of the test remains objectionable; such a determination should not be left to the trial court. See
Brodsky, In Pari Delicto Defense Reviewed, 174 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1975, at 2, col. 1-2.
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Perma Life, would allow the assertion of the defense where there has been
substantial equality of involvement. Hence Woolf might best be limited to its
facts.
The better model in cases where in pari delicto is asserted is that provided
by Katz v. Amos Treat & Co. 92 and by James v. DuBreuil.9 3 In Katz,
plaintiff's subsequent transfers to third parties in violation of section 12 of the
1933 Act94 were properly regarded as separate transactions from defendant's
sale to plaintiff of unregistered securities-a situation analogous to Woolf.9s In
James, however, plaintiff's agreement to back-date certain documents ille-
gally was essential to the very sale that plaintiff claimed was fraudulent and
sought to rescind. The court emphasized that plaintiff's intent was to con-
summate and profit from a plainly illegal transaction. 96 These two cases
provide a simple rule: where the plaintiff's violation is a part of the transac-
tion he complains of and is roughly equal in magnitude to defendant's, the
plaintiff's complaint should be barred. This test has the advantage of favoring
those whom the statute was meant to protect-the investing public-without
immunizing culpable plaintiffs from liability. In addition, the test permits
ready applicability without the need of tenuous policy determinations by the
trial court, such as estimates of "public impact." 97 This test as applied in Katz
and James resulted in holdings that the defense was available in both cases,
but was only established in the latter.
In both cases defendants' violations must have affected the market in the
shares they were selling; but whether that kind of effect is "significant" is
unclear under Woolf. In practice the courts have generally regarded the
defense as admissible in fraud cases, but apparently because of the presence of
the statutorily "protected class" of investors, the defense, once admitted, has
been difficult for defendants to establish. 98
E. Illegality and In Pari Delicto
In many cases where in pari delicto is asserted an additional defense alleged
is that the transaction is void because it was illegal, and the plaintiff's
participation in it bars his suit for performance, rescission, or damages. 99 This
common law theory is still regularly asserted.100
92. 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
93. 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
95. 411 F.2d at 1054; accord, Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d 655 (Sth Cir. 1975)
(postmerger misuse of funds by target management did not bar their suit to rescind merger).
96. 500 F.2d at 157-58.
97. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
98. E.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Hooper v. Mountain States Secs. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); cf. Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.). cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959)
(court held plaintiff was barred by unclean hands but also held defendants innocent of any
violation); Malaxnphy v. Real-Tex Enterprises, No. 74-2050 (4th Cir., Oct. 20, 1975); note 79
supra.
99. 6A Corbin, supra note 38, § 1536, at 822-26; 2 Pomeroy, supra note 38, §§ 402(0, 403.
100. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
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The weight of authority, however, is that if the investor protection policy in
securities cases will be furthered, plaintiff's recovery is permissible, especially
if there has been substantial performance. 10' In A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
d'Alene Mines Corp., 10 2 an early case under the 1933 Act, the Supreme Court
held that the plain intent of that Act was to protect purchasers by giving them
express causes of action. Thus, application of the usual rule denying enforce-
ment to illegal contracts would do violence to the express public policy of the
Act.1 0 3 The petitioner in Frost was the assignee of an option to purchase
unregistered securities. He sued for damages when respondent repudiated the
option contract after partial performance. The lower courts refused to enforce
the remainder of the option and as to this the Supreme Court agreed. But the
Idaho Supreme Court had also refused to enforce petitioner's claim for
damages based on the issuer's failure to remit as agreed the payments it had
received on its sale to third parties of some of the optioned shares. Those
shares were already delivered and in the hands of the investing public. 10 4 The
Supreme Court reversed, compelling respondent to pay damages based on the
executed portion of the contract, even though the Court assumed that the
failure to register the shares violated the 1933 Act and that the assignee was
aware of this fact.10 s
The 1934 Act has an express provision concerning illegal transactions.
Section 29(b) of the Act provides:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter ... and every
contract... the performance of which involves the violation of. .any provision of
this chapter ... shall be void.., as regards the rights of any person who, in violation
of any such provision ... shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such
contract .... 106
Despite the fact that this language appears to bar anyone who has performed
under, or even entered into, an illegal contract, the section is uniformly
construed in accord with Frost, 107 so that such a contract will not be held
void but may be enforced to the extent plaintiff has performed under it. This
construction has recently been supported by the Supreme Court.10 8 The
controlling premise has been a finding that plaintiffs were not primarily
101. See A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38 (1941); cf. 6A Corbin,
supra note 38, § 1540, at 836; 2 Pomeroy, supra note 38, §§ 402(c), (f), 403.
102. 312 U.S. 38 (1941).
103. Id. at 41-43.
104. Id. at 39-40; cf. Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 856 (1952), in which the court refused to compel performance by defendant underwriter
of a wholly executory contract found to be illegal, despite plaintiff issuer's assertion that
defendant had been aware of plaintiff's misrepresentations even before signing the contract. Id.
at 843-44.
105. 312 U.S. at 43-45.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
107. See, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 726 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, 496
F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
108. The Supreme Court has recently cited section 29(b) as "providing that a contract made in
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responsible for the illegality. In Frost, petitioner merely had knowledge of the
issuer's failure to register. In other cases the rule has commonly been stated
that such contracts are not void but merely voidable at the option of an
innocent party. 10 9
Nonetheless, when there is a semblance of equality in the violations by each
party, the courts have sometimes devised flexible interpretations of section
29(b). In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, 110 plain-
tiff, having contracted to sell defendant a subsidiary company, sued for
damages after defendantes failure to make certain periodic payments. The case
was removed to federal court where defendant counterclaimed that plaintiff's
failure to disclose material facts about the subsidiary was in violation of the
1934 Act, thus entitling defendant to rescission.' The court, in denying
rescission, based its ruling on the statute of limitations and defendant's lack of
diligence. 112 However, most of its analysis was devoted to defendant's alter-
native theory: that under the explicit language of section 29(b), plaintiff was
one who had "engaged in the performance of" an illegal contract-by
transferring title under the sale-and therefore should be barred from enforc-
ing it.' 3 The court noted that Frost and its progeny were based on the
presumption that voiding a contract except at an innocent party's request
would usually reward wrongdoers. It took the view that section 29(b)
supplemented rather than superseded the common law, especially when the
violator had performed under the contract." 4
The decision to compel performance while awarding defendant some dam-
ages was based on the fact that since the defendant had benefited under the
contract, voidance would benefit it twice.s Equitable considerations would
violation of any provision of the 1934 Act is voidable at the option of the deceived party." Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735 (1975).
109. See, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 726 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); cases cited in note 89 supra. There is contrary
authority, however, holding such contracts void. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). In Myzel, however, the court was unconvinced of either partys
honesty at trial 386 F.2d at 736.
110. 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
111. Id. at 1259-60.
112. Id. at 1268.
113. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970), in text
accompanying note 106 supra.
114. 496 F.2d at 1265-67. The court relied upon Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d
1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting) ("There has
been a conspicuous lack of judicial enthusiasm for the doctrine . . . when there has been
performance by the violator . . . ." (citations omitted)).
115. 496 F.2d at 1267. For equitable reasons the court also denied defendant's alternative
request for rescission, which was based on the assertion that under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act,
rescission is "statutory" and therefore the district court had no discretion to bar it. The court's
holding on this point is supported by analogy to Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49
(1975), where the Supreme Court found that traditional equitable requirements governed the
availability of a non-"statutory" injunction and, arguably, any injunction sought on a technical
violation.
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seem to compel a strict application of section 29(b) had defendant's unclean
hands resulted from securities violations in the same transaction, rather than
from subsequent breaches of contract.' 1 6
F. Plaintiffs' Participation and Statutes of Limitation
Even when resort to in pari delicto or illegality is unavailable, a significant
number of federal courts, as courts of equity, have barred culpable plaintiffs
by discretionary use of statutes of limitations. The Acts provide limitation
periods for express actions,1 17 and the settled rule in implied actions is that
the most analogous state statute governs.1 8 However, the period for express
actions is often extended for innocent plaintiffs by the equitable tolling
rule." 9 In determining the applicable period for implied actions, federal
courts may choose among the forum state's statutes of limitations for securi-
ties, general fraud, or contract actions.' 20 With regard to implied actions, the
courts frequently choose the longer statute of limitations in order to effec-
tuate better the investor protection function of the securities laws.' 2' But the
courts have also shown willingness to withhold that discretionary power in
appropriate cases, where plaintiffs' conduct has been questionable.
A good example of the courts' exercise of equitable discretion was presented
by Maine v. Leonard. 122 Shares of an electronics corporation (ECI) which was
about to merge were sold through a broker by Maine, ECI's chief engineer, to
Leonard, an attorney who was familiar with ECI and had represented it. The
evidence showed that, at the time of sale, both had inside information
regarding the company and the proposed merger. After hearing evidence of
each party's fraudulent conduct, the court noted that both were so involved
with the questionable affairs of ECI that they must have been on notice of the
violations 23 almost immediately upon the sale. Consequently, the court
refused to toll the statute of limitations and dismissed the claims. 124
116. See 496 F.2d at 1266-67. Compare the dissent in Pearlstein: "Equity and justice are
qualities that [plaintiff's] claim conspicuously lacks. He bought the bonds against defendant's
advice, refused to sell them on its urging, remained silent when defendant was pressing for
payment, and settled his liability after having had legal advice. Equity would leave the loss
where it lies." 429 F.2d at 1149.
117. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 18(c), 29(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78r(c), 78cc(b)(2)(B)
(1970); Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
118. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884,
890 (9th Cir. 1968).
119. See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1119 (7th Cir, 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1976) (No. 74-1042); Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F.
Supp. 473, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1973); note 8 supra.
120. Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972); see Ruder & Cross,
Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 Duke L.J. 1125, 1144-47.
121. See, e.g., Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1975);
Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971). But see Hudak v.
Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1122 (1975).
122. 365 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1973).
123. Id. at 1278.
124. Id. at 1285-86.
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The clearest case on the use of statutes of limitations against undeserving
investors remains Rosenberg v. Hano. 125 In that case, plaintiff purchased
stock in reliance on defendant's false promise to engage in illegal conduct that
would inflate the value of the shares. When their value declined plaintiff
sued. The court found that it was irrelevant whether plaintiff's theory was
misrepresentation or price manipulation, 126 since he had notice of the in-
tended violation even before the sale. However, because plaintiff buyer did
not participate in but merely knew of the planned illegal conduct, the court
found the in pari delicto defense unavailable. Nonetheless, the court held that
plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations because of the lapse of more
than a year since he had become aware of all the relevant facts.12 7
Such decisions demonstrate the desirability of broad equitable discretion in
the hands of the trial court. In cases involving in pari delicto, inequitable
results are reached when plaintiffs are allowed to take unconscionable advan-
tage of broad policy formulations or the general investor protection purpose of
the Acts which create a presumption in their favor.128
II. DEFENSES OF PLAINTIFFS' ACQUIESCENCE
Waiver, 29 estoppel,' 30 and laches13' are frequently asserted against plain-
125. 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941).
126. Price manipulation is governed by Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i
(1970).
127. 121 F.2d at 821-22; cf. Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1345-47 (2d Cir. 1972).
128. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court mandated "resolving doubts in favor of those
the [Acts are] designed to protect," based on their legislative history. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970). One commentator has argued that in pari delicto should not be
recognized in any case arising under the 1934 Act, stating that in pari delicto and unclean hands
are "ill-defined." Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity of Common Law
Defenses to Private Actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1, 23
(1970). He further observed that "this conclusion does not preclude [elimination of confusion and
injustice] since an 'actively participating' plaintiff can be barred from recovery on a policy basis."
Id. How such a rule would differ from the in pari delicto rule is unclear. It is certainly more
"ill-defined" and further tends to diminish the deterrent effect of the Acts. See note 38 supra.
129. Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. Dobbs, supra
note 38, § 2.3, at 43; see 5 S. Williston, Contracts §§ 678, 697 (3d ed. 1961). One issue arising in
securities cases has been whether common law was superseded by § 14 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970) and a similar provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970). The latter provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." The
Supreme Court made it clear, however, that section 14 barred only waivers prior to violation, not
those given upon deliberation after a right has accrued. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). But
see Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. S 94,786 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
130. An estoppel is created by conduct of plaintiff which he knows is inconsistent with the
assertion of his right against defendant, upon which the latter reasonably relies to his detriment.
Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882
(1960); Dobbs, supra note 38, § 2.3, at 41-43.
131. The doctrine of laches is a defense that may be raised in an action brought after an
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tiffs in securities cases. These claims of plaintiffs' acquiescence generally have
met with more success than assertions of plaintiffs' complicity.' 32 This success
may be due in part to the absence of any limitations formulated by the
Supreme Court, comparable to the Perma Life ruling on in pari delicto, that
might qualify the statutory language which preserved such legal or equitable
actions and rights that are normally available in the federal courts.1 33 It may
also follow from the fact that few of the reported decisions turning on these
arguments have been close cases. Since the equities were clear, the threshold
issue of the availability of the defenses was seldom discussed. 134
The waiver, estoppel and laches defenses are frequently raised in "churn-
ing" cases, where it is alleged that the defendant broker-dealer overtraded
plaintiff's discretionary investment account over a period of time in an effort
unjustified delay that has prejudiced the defendant. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282
(1961); Dobbs, supra note 38, § 2.3, at 43-44.
132. Frequently, the defenses based on assertions of plaintiffs' complicity are summarily
dismissed. See Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 277 (10th Cir. 1957) ("The
other contentions of the defendants have been considered. They are all so obviously lacking in
merit as to deserve no mention herein."). Presumably, assiduous counsel will assert each defense
so long as the suit or defense, as a whole, is not meritless under Securities Act of 1933 § 1 l(e), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (permitting the assessment of costs against any party making a claim or
defense "without merit"). Cf. Rucker v. La-Co, Inc., 496 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1974). The
defense of ultra vires is still raised, albeit infrequently, although it is practically a dead letter as a
defense in corporation law. H. Henn, Corporations § 184 (2d ed. 1970); see Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v.
Wheelis, supra, at 276..
133. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
134. See, e.g., Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd per curiam,
390 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1968). A trend to strike the defense of laches on the theory that the statutes
of limitations in the Acts were intended to supersede the doctrine-a theory not used in modern
times outside securities cases-seems to be near an end. Such a view is described as outdated, 2
Pomeroy, supra note 38, § 419b, at 174-75, but the Ninth Circuit has regarded investor protection
as paramount in holding laches unavailable in a damage action. Straley v. Universal Uranium &
Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1961). The court later modified its view to permit
laches in a lob-5 action for the reason that the action was implied by the courts and not statutory.
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir. 1962). The restriction has been
followed only rarely. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968). The weight of authority is opposed. See Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), modified on other grounds, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v.
Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327-28 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
The obvious failing of the old rule was that the investor was given a "free ride" of up to three
years under section 13 of the 1933 Act. Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches
Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5: Deterrence and Equity
in Balance, 73 Yale L.J. 1477, 1487-88 (1964). As the Ninth Circuit itself noted in another
context, "[tihe purpose of the [1934] Act is to protect the innocent investor, not one who loses his
innocence and then waits to see how his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the
provisions of the Act." Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
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to increase his commissions without regard to his customer's interest.' 35 One
illustrative case was Fey v. Walston & Co., 36 where the court noted that the
plaintiff maintained at least two other investment accounts in addition to that
with the defendant, took investment advice from her son who had a "gam-
bling problem," attempted to conceal these facts from defendant, and gave
contradictory testimony at trial. '37 The court of appeals, overturning plain-
tiff's verdict, held that the trial court had improperly excluded much of the
evidence of these facts and suggested that the circumstances could have been
viewed by the jury as acquiescence by the plaintiff in the amount and kind of
trading being done for her account. 138 In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 139
plaintiff met weekly with her broker to discuss all transactions made for her
account. After nearly seven years she alleged overtrading. The court affirmed
the trial court's finding that laches and estoppel barred plaintiff's claim. 140
The equities were less clear in Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 14 1 although the court did not indulge any presumption in favor
of the investor. The alleged churning occurred over a five-year period and suit
was filed two years and eight months after plaintiff had closed her account
with defendant. The trial court granted defendantes summary judgment
motion, holding that the statutory period had run. The Tenth Circuit reversed
on the ground that plaintiff, who was foreign-born, had only heard of
churning ten months before filing suit. 142 The court of appeals found,
however, that plaintiff was not necessarily entitled to judgment on these facts
alone, but remanded the case, instructing the district court to try the issue of
laches. 143
The potential for abuse in all these cases is plain. If the plaintiffs who
permit brokers to engage in speculation are allowed to disaffirm if the return
is disappointing, manifest injustice will result. Consequently, the courts avoid
broad policy statements, focusing instead on plaintiffs' credibility and thus on
equitable considerations. The same is also true in most non-margin cases
where sufficient facts emerge about plaintiffs' knowledge and intent. For
135. Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1967). 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15cl-7(a) (1975) defines excessive activity in discretionary accounts. Such claims may be brought
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Recordkeeping is required
of brokers and the SEC is authorized to inspect these records. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
136. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 1040-45.
138. Id. at 1051.
139. 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
140. Id. at 1207-09. One commentator has questioned what harm came to defendants in
Hecht so as to justify this holding. Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule
lob-5 Actions, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 651, 665. Plainly, had plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the
course of trading earlier, the broker would have attempted to limit its potential damages.
141. 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974).
142. Id. at 169-70.
143. Id. at 171-73.
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example, in Walpert v. Bart, 144 a fifty-day delay constituted laches where a
dissenting shareholder silently opposed an acquisition, intending to seek an
injunction but failing to so advise defendant management. 145 The latter,
along with innocent third parties, had predictably embarked on an expensive
course of conduct in concluding the acquisition.
In the few reported cases in which the validity of a waiver of a securities
violation has been ruled upon, the courts have sometimes honored waivers
unless it has been demonstrated that they were made before any claim arose
or without the claimant's full knowledge of his rights. 14 6 However, it is
commonly held that a waiver having the effect of perpetuating a violation will
be voided. 147 Moreover, in cases of fraud, a valid waiver may be inferred
from plaintiff's conduct or inaction. 148 This distinction between fraud and
other violations seems a sound one. 149 To bar waivers of fraud would
encourage speculation, as, for example, in churning cases. To permit waiver
in other cases, allowing a "victim" to affirm proscribed conduct, would give
judicial sanction to continuing violations of the Acts--besides arguably put-
ting the "victim" in pari delicto with the offender.
150
144. 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1967).
145. Id. at 1017.
146. This is so although the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide that any agreement "binding any
person to waive compliance" with the Acts or rules thereunder "shall be void." See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970); Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77n (1970); Wilko v. Swan, 346.U.S. 427 (1953); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389
F.2d 242, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1968); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.
1964); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
147. Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 835 (1975); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Tenney
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 280, 283-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 51 F.R.D. 167,
171-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971), plaintiff was allowed to recover for a margin violation against
defendant lender although he had earlier entered into a settlement with defendant. In Rosen v.
Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 94,786, at 96,604 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
plaintiff trustees in reorganization were not bound by defendant management's release of its claim
against an alleged aider and abettor.
148. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. Landry v.
Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373-74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973)
(plaintiff customer held estopped from arguing he was an "investor" as basis of his allegation of
churning, because of his "uncomplaining acceptance of what was done for him by defendants
over a twenty-two month period'); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 615 (D. Mass. 1955)
(plaintiff "by failing seasonably to make complaints of facts of which she was informed (was]
barred from her late assertion of wrong").
149. The distinction is, of course, consistent with common law. 6A Corbin, supra note 38,
§ 1515 at 727, 730-31; W. Seavey, Agency § 98 (1964).
150. In pari delicto could be found in such situations because the factors of equal knowledge,
intent and cooperation in a single transaction would be present, despite the non-simultaneous
acts. See Rosen v. Dick, (1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,786, at 96,606
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (waiver between two defendants allegedly made to defraud plaintiffs held void);
cf. 11 S. Williston, Contracts § 1429 (3d ed. 1968).
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III. THE "CONTROLLING PERSONS" SECTIONS: JUDICIAL
RESISTANCE TO A STATUTORY DEFENSE
The third significant defense question which is currently debated in securi-
ties cases and arises frequently is the interrelation of common law vicarious
liability15 1 with the "controlling persons" sections. The 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise ... controls
any person liable under sections 77k or 771 ...shall also be liable ...unless the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged
to exist.1
5 2
The 1934 Act has a comparable provision: "Every person who, directly or
indirectly, controls any person liable . ..shall also be liable ... unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation ....
In contrast to the courts' frequent resistance to common law defenses, there
is a strong judicial preference for the common law over the Acts in this
instance. The reason may be that inclusion of agency arguments tends to
benefit securities plaintiffs, whereas the statutory versions are favorable to
defendants because of the good faith defense they provide. The SEC and most
other plaintiffs have consistently urged that section 15 of the 1933 Act and
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act 15 4 are merely supplemental and should only be
applied when a particular employer or principal cannot be reached through
common law theories.' 55 However, there is a strong division of opinion
among the courts of appeals.' 5 6
151. See generally H. Ballantine, Corporations § 109 (rev. ed. 1946); W. Seavey, Agency
§§ 55-58, 91 (1964). For discussion of the related common law theory of aiding and abetting
(incorporated in § 15(b)(5)(E) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970)) and conspiracy
liability under the Acts, see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316-17 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pani
Deicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 62046 (1972).
152. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
153. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970); see Note, The Burden
of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1019 (1973).
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t(a) (1970).
155. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 608
(1972); Comment, Vicarious Liability for Securities Law Violations: Respondeat Superior and the
Controlling Person Sections, 15 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 713, 722 (1974).
156. The view that the sections are exclusive and do not supplement common law seems to be
taken by the Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits and until recently was the general rule of the
Second Circuit. See, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. S
95,313 (3d Cir., Sept. 29, 1975) (but see discussion at note 181 infra); Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,
521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 469 (1975); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d
34, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir.
1970); Kamen v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393
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In favor of excluding respondeat superior and agency theories it is argued
that, first, the statutory language on its face appears all-inclusive, i.e.,
"[e]very person who . . . through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise...
controls" in the 1933 Act, and "[e]very person who, directly or indirectly,
controls" in the 1934 Act. 157 Hence every employer who could under common
law be liable as a principal or through respondeat superior is now brought
within the terms of these sections, so that the sections' good faith defense
should always be available. Second, as the court stated in Lanza v. Drexel &
Co.,1 58 since Congress provided the good faith defenses, "[t]he intent of
Congress in adding [these sections] was obviously to impose liability only on
those directors who fall within [their] definition of control and who are in
some meaningful sense culpable participants in the fraud perpetrated by
controlled persons."15 9 Third, it would be "unreasonable" to suppose that
Congress meant to provide a good faith defense only for superiors who are not
within the employment or agency relationship, and strict liability (the result
under common law) for those who are. 160 Finally, it is argued that respondeat
superior and agency doctrines should be excluded by analogy to Blau v.
Lehman, 16 1 in which the Supreme Court held that section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, 162 specifying those persons who may be sued for taking short-swing
profits, was exclusive. 163 If, under Blau, -a restrictive statute with a clear limit
on securities acts liability is to be exclusive when it designates those against
whom an action may be maintained, sections 15 and 20(a) should also be
exclusive, particularly since their language is broad and inclusive. In Blau
the Court ruled that a partnership was not liable for short-swing trading in
the shares of a corporation in which one partner served as a director, absent a
U.S. 801 (1968) (dictum). The rule in the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits is contrary,
permitting assertion of principal-agent liability. See cases cited in notes 172-74 infra. The Second
Circuit rule had also excluded respondeat superior and agency arguments. See, e.g., Gordon v. Burr,
506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Contra, SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975) (but see note 178 infra). The view of one
circuit on the exclusivity of the statutory sections is unclear. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.
1967), cerf. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (dictum) (affirming trial court verdict where jury was Instructed
that employer had to "know and approve" of employee's act to be liable).
157. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970); Securities Act of 1933
§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); see SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
158. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
159. Id. at 1299 (dictum).
160. Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 & n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
161. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
163. The case's authority may be uncertain beyond its facts, since it was relied upon by the
lower court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc),
which was reversed by the Supreme Court, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), a year after Blau was decided.
The Second Circuit had cited Blau for the proposition that courts were to avoid "excessive
judicial expansion of provisions of the securities laws to accomplish objectives believed to be
salutary." 306 F.2d at 609. But see discussion at note 168 infra and accompanying text.
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finding that the particular partner had advised the purchase or was deputized
to represent the partnership on the board of directors. The Court wrote:
"[L]iability under § 16(b) is to be determined neither by general partnership
law nor by adding to the 'prophylactic' effect Congress itself clearly prescribed
in § 16(b). ' ' 164
A similar view seems to prevail in the Court's recent decision in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 165 In that case, defendant Blue Chip had
prepared a prospectus on a common stock offering under the terms of an
antitrust consent decree. Plaintiffs sought damages, alleging that the prospec-
tus was overly pessimistic and materially misleading, and had been prepared
in an effort to dissuade plaintiffs from accepting the offer. The Court held
that only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring an action for damages
under section 10(b). 166 While acknowledging that it had often urged flexible
construction of the Acts 167 and that "[n]o language in either [section 10(b) or
rule 10b-5] speaks at all to the contours of a private cause of action for their
violation,' 6 18 the Court pointed out that "[w]hen Congress wished to provide
a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble
in doing so expressly [in section 16(b) of the 1934 Act]. 1 69 The Court's clear
reliance upon the statutory language' 70 seems to signal a far more conserva-
tive approach to "flexible" construction of the Acts and by analogy it supports
a construction of the "controlling persons" sections as applying in all cases, to
the exclusion of the common law of agency.
However, the large majority of circuit courts have stated that, at least in
some circumstances, sections 15 and 20(a) merely supplement prior law. One
argument advanced to support this interpretation is that, "given the pervasive
applicability of agency principles elsewhere in the law, it would take clear
evidence to persuade us that Congress intended to supplant such principles by
enacting the 'controlling person' provisions. "17 1 Another court has concluded
164. 368 U.S. at 414. Lehman Bros. had partners sitting on 100 corporate boards. The
dissent noted: "[F]ormal designation is no more significant than informal approval." Id. at 41S
(Warren, C.J., & Douglas, J., dissenting). This is no longer a common practice of investment
advisors. See Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals & Rule 10b-S: Legal Standards, Industry
Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 Fordham L. Rev. SOS, 519-20 &
n.50 (1975).
165. 421 U.S. 723 (1975), noted in 44 Fordham L. Rev. 452 (1975).
166. 421 U.S. at 755.
167. Id. at 748-49.
168. Id. at 749.
169. Id. at 734. Blue Chip's precise holding and this particular analogy seem to revive the
rule of Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 161-64 supra,
that statutory language should not lightly be expanded merely to achieve policy results favored by
a court.
170. The Court emphasized that its focus iw on the words of § 10(b), "in connection %vith the
purchase or sale," although it must be noted that this is hardly the dearest language in the Acts and a
contrary interpretation of it is certainly plausible. See 421 U.S. at 764-68 (Blackmun, Douglas &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting); 44 Fordham L. Rev. 452, 460-62 (1975).
171. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendants'
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that section 15 was not intended to apply to the "employer (brokerage
house)-employee relationship" because employers could "seemingly escape
all liability . . . by the simple expedient of making certain 'not to know or
have reasonable grounds to believe .... ' ",172 A third rationale for combining
common law liability with "controlling persons" liability is that "the recog-
nized policy of public protection requires the two types of remedy to be
complementary, rather than mutually exclusive."1 73 Indeed, the effect of this
policy rationale has occasionally been to exclude altogether the statutory
version and thereby the defense Congress specifically provided. 174
It is submitted that most of the cases in which the statutory version has
been held non-exclusive have stated an overbroad rule, perhaps influenced by
the language of the Supreme Court encouraging flexibility, 17" and can be
harmonized on their facts to coincide with the better view that the sections
should be an exclusive determinant of liability.1 76 When such a view is taken,
if the culpable "controlled person" is a corporate officer or inside director,
corporate liability will still be appropriate, since "it is difficult to conceive of a
corporation acting in any other way than by its managing officers and
directors. ' 177 This logic would not seem to be in conflict with the language
and purpose of the Acts since the good faith defense remains available. The
effect is merely to make the central question one of the wrongdoer's position
in the corporate structure. If he is directly responsible to other persons, those
supervisors' good faith is then the issue. But if he is vested with significant
power and authority and is independent of other persons, it has been
suggested that his knowledge is imputed to the corporation, thus destroying
its good faith defense.17 8 In conventional employment cases, e.g., where
relationship was that of corporation and officer); accord, Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502
F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
172. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1211, 1213 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd In
part & rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
173. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 n.18 (7th Cir. 1974); see cases cited in notes
171-72 supra.
174. 493 F.2d at 1052 & n.19 (it was not error for trial court to refuse to read jury the
statutory defenses); accord, Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
175. See text accompanying notes 25 & 167 supra.
176. E.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 469
(1975).
177. SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This, of course, is the
rationale of corporate liability at common law. See Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U.S. 256,
261-62 (1886). However, the same courtjn the same year held a corporate president not to be
controlled by the corporation when fraudulently promoting its shares, but for reasons not
appearing in the opinion. The court indicated that the plaintiff's case against the corporation was
meager. Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 506
F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974).
178. SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court in SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975), may have had this distinction between
managing officers or directors and other employees in mind when it held defendant liable for Its
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brokerage house employees are defendants, a more detailed analysis of
"control," "good faith" and "reasonable ground to believe,' 9 particularly in
light of extensive regulations requiring employee supervision, 80 should yield
more consistent decisions.' 8' The theory that supervisors can evade knowl-
edge and thereby liability' 8 2 is seriously weakened by the duty to supervise
arising from their capacities as brokers, dealers, underwriters, or investment
advisers under the Acts,18 3 and also, as some argue, by the good faith defense
itself.' 8 4 A court unwilling to hear evidence on the issue of good faith will
hold the broker or other employer strictly liable.' 8S This clearly contravenes
vice president's violation but cautioned that it expressed no view concerning lesser employees "or
respondeat superior." Id. at 813; see note 156 supra. But see SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., [Current
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,441 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1976).
179. See notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
180. See New York Stock Exchange Rules 342, 345, 2 CCH NYSE Guide 2342, 234S
(1975); National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 27, CCH
NASD Manual 2177 (1974); note 186 infra. In addition, a private cause of action may be
available against broker-dealers for violations of exchange and association rules. See Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1966); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F.
Supp. 518, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 12 (1966); Note, Theories of Liability under Convertible Debenture
Redemption Notice Requirements, 44 Fordhan L. Rev. 817, 822-27 (1976). But see Jenny v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,021
(S.D.N.Y. March 11, 1975).
181. The court in Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974) reached a proper conclusion
in holding the broker-dealer not "controlling" where its customers' man both met plaintiff and
transacted plaintiff's purchase away from the broker's office. Id. at 1082-83, 1085-86. In SEC v.
First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972), corporate liability was
properly found where defendant's president had unsupervised power to misuse the corporate
name and facilities and to keep knowledge of his illegal acts from other officers and employees.
Similarly, in Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,313, at
98,589 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 1975), the court, holding section 20(a) to be exclusive, found that the
defendant corporation established the good faith defense where the corporate president's purchase
was shown to be "personal." Although the corporation was a "nominal party" to the contract, its
function was ministerial since the purchase price was paid by the president and the shares were
transferred to him. Id. at 98,592-93.
182. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
183. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(5)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o0b(SXE) (1970)
(for purposes of disciplinary action by the SEC, "no person shall be deemed to have failed
reasonably to supervise any person, if... there have been established procedures, and.., such
person has reasonably discharged [his] duties [under] such procedures . . . without reasonable
cause to believe that [they] were not being complied with"); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503
F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1976) (No.
74-1042); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
184. See, e.g., Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 460 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
185. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1974). Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. CL 469 (1975), the Ninth
Circuit's most recent application of section 20(a), would have presented a very different issue
had it arisen in a circuit which does not exclude the respondeat superior theory. In Zweig, the
issue was whether a newspaper publisher could be held liable for a recommendation made by
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its financial columnist for investment in a stock that he owned. The price rose "dramat-
ically" after the columnist's recommendation and he sold immediately. The price later declined
and the plaintiffs brought a section 10(b) action against the columnist and the newspaper,
Id. at 1131. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its rule that respondeat superior is unavailable in
securities actions and went on to find that the newspaper had acted in good faith, although the
court set a far lower standard than that generally required of broker-dealers under section 20(a).
The court noted that Hearst did not in fact supervise the financial columnist. Id. at 1132-33.
However, the court emphasized that the writer had been so employed for thirty years without
prior complaint, and held that in judging the publisher's liability "[s]ome lesser standard
amounting more nearly to culpability is indicated." The court reasoned that, although the
investing public relies to some extent on such investment advice as defendants published, "to
liken the relationship ... to the practically fiduciary relationship between the broker and his
customer is to depart from reality." Id. at 1135. The court concluded that the broker-dealer's
duty is greater because such an employer derives direct financial gain from the acts of its
employees and "[tihe opportunity and temptation to take advantage of the client is ever present."
Id. Compare Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (mem.), appeal
dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (proper standard under section 10(b) for defendant,
Barron's Weekly, considering its first amendment privilege, should be recklessness, where
allegation was of negligence in printing estimated earnings).
The precise question, whether the publisher of a newspaper, either financial or general, might
be held liable if an employee is found to have inserted financial advice in its columns in order to
stimulate interest in shares he owns, has apparently never been decided. However, certain dicta,
as well as analogous cases, suggest that, had iespondeat superior been available In Zweig, a
different result might have been reached. Where a writer or publisher agrees for a "past or
prospective" consideration to write about a security, publication failing to disclose the payment
violates § 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1970). Newspapers' liability in
this context does not violate the first amendment. United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 365 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971). Congress had apparently not meant any publication to be
exempt from section 17(b). It was "particularly designed to meet the evils of the 'tipster sheet' as
well as articles in newspapers or periodicals that purport to give an unbiased opinion but which
opinions are in reality bought and paid for." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933).
Similarly, where a "publication is engaged in ... the offering of professional investment advice
without revealing the possibility of personal gain to the publisher," it may be required to register
under § 202(a)(11)(D) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1970).
SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958
(1970); cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Although the Act
exempts "bona-fide newspapers," the Second Circuit found that "[w]hat matters [in making the
determination of 'bona-fide' status] is whether or not a specific publication is engaged in practices
which the Act was intended to regulate . . . ." 422 F.2d at 1378. Defendants in the Wall Street
Transcript case argued that their activities were merely those of a typical financial columnist "on
a larger scale." The court disagreed, but noted: "[W]e express no opinion concerning the practices
of [such] other publications. ... Id. at 1377 & n.10.
Facts similar to those in the Zweig case were considered in In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades &
Co., Exchange Act Rel. No. 5870 (Feb. 9, 1959) [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 76,635, at 80,426. Underwriters of an offering sent a pre-offering news release that
omitted material facts to the press, and were ruled by the SEC to have violated § 5(c) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970). The Commission noted: "It should be clear that
our interpretation of Section 5(c) in no way restricts the freedom of news media to seek out and
publish financial news. Reporters presumably have no securities to sell and, absent collusion with
sellers, Section 5(c) has no application to them." Id. at 80,432 n.19; see I L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 221 (2d ed. 1961) ("It goes without saying that genuine news articles about securities
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the congressional purpose in enacting sections 15 and 20(a).t 8 6 Since Congress
has spoken with reasonable clarity,' 8 7 such cases overstep the courts' discre-
tion to import prior law and procedure into the Acts, notwithstanding the
policy of investor protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress' plan for a comprehensive scheme of securities regulation seem-
ingly provided for judicial flexibility in its application, as evidenced by
legislative reference to the existing systems and presumptions of courts of law
and equity. Because of imprecision in the statutory language, however, the
courts have been flexible in their interpretation of the Acts. A liberal interpre-
tation of the securities laws' investor protection function has led some courts
to eliminate or curtail traditional equitable defenses and theories.
Plaintiffs' violations are frequently minimized or ignored by courts which
inappropriately resort to policy arguments in cases to which, in equity, they
do not apply. Such overbroad rules inhibit the courts' traditional equitable
discretion. As a result, investors have been able to escape their debts when
suing on margin violations for which they were responsible. These were the
least deserving beneficiaries of the overextended presumptions favoring plain-
tiffs. Similarly, tippees defrauded by insiders often have their own violations
overlooked, although the courts are in complete disagreement on whether
such a policy helps or hinders enforcement of the Acts. And, again relying on
unsatisfactory policy arguments, the majority of circuit courts have unjusti-
or their issuers are in no sense prohibited by § 5, since the newspaper is not selling any
securities'); cf. SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 267-69 (E.D. Wash. 1939) ("description" by
offeror-publisher held an unregistered public offering).
While the result in Zweig seems correct, especially since the newspaper was disinterested and
was not on notice to suspect its employees as a broker-dealer would be, other courts would not be
so willing to provide Hearst with the good faith defense to the exclusion of common law liability.
Moreover, it might successfully be argued to those courts that section 10(b) should extend to
writers and publishers who are interested by reason of potential sale, since the policy expressed in
Securities Exchange Act section 17(b) and in the 1940 Act plainly reaches writers and publishers
interested by reason of compensation. Where the newspaper's employee, about whom it has
notice (the standard of section 20(a)) or who acts in the course of his employment (the common
law test), is shown to have owned shares, recommended them, and then sold them, then
theoretical liability might well be found (although the issue of causation might frequently defeat a
plaintiff in a market purchase).
186. Although the hearings, debates and reports prior to enactment lack discussion of what
evidence might demonstrate "good faith," it seems reasonable to look to the industry regulations
(required and outlined by § ISA of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970)
and SEC rules thereunder) which deal with employee supervision, in order to determine what
Congress might have envisioned when it provided in § 20(a) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)
(1970), that "good faith" would negate employer liability. If an employer has fully complied with
the letter and spirit of the extensive self-regulation requirements of the industry, see, e.g., note
180 supra, and of the "controlling persons" sections, he should not be held liable for an
employee's violation. Otherwise, the self-regulatory provisions and section 20(a) would have
meaning only when an employer has violated them, and never when it has complied with them.
187. See text accompanying notes 157-64 supra. Compare text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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fiably resisted the express statutory defense of good faith or virtually read it
out of the Acts by holding that it is supplemental to common law vicarious
liability theories. By contrast, most courts have readily entertained the laches,
estoppel and waiver defenses and, by exercising equitable discretion, have
generally reached results within the spirit of the Acts. No rationale has been
expressed by the courts explaining their acceptance of these defenses in
contrast with their resistance to the defense of in pari delicto. The distinction
is unclear, especially since a plaintiff guilty of mere delay is not normally so
culpable or undeserving as one who has participated in acts constituting
violations of the securities laws. Perhaps the courts simply presume the
availability of waiver, estoppel and laches in proceedings "at law or in
equity." That justification for admitting these defenses seems proper and
should apply equally to defenses of plaintiffs' participation.
There is an ongoing conflict between the language of the securities acts on
one hand and common law "gap-filling" and policy considerations on the
other. The courts have developed sometimes inconsistent standards for admit-
ting non-statutory defenses in different kinds of cases. Their judgments have
frequently been warranted considering both the purpose of the Acts and a
realistic weighing of the equities of the parties. However, the tendency is still
to favor plaintiffs with an inflexible construction of the Acts. It is submitted,
for example, that there is no valid policy ground for limiting the availability
of in pan delicto. Applied under traditional rules, it bars only actual
participants-equal and willing violators. In a proper case the defense of in
pari delicto may be denied if it is found that enforcement considerations
mandate recovery, 188 although it is submitted that the defense should not be
excluded lightly in view of the likelihood that potential plaintiffs' violations
will be encouraged rather than deterred. This case-by-case approach, effec-
tively used by the courts in laches and estoppel cases, is the essence of equity.
It would most often avoid unjust rewards to culpable plaintiffs while offering
increased deterrence to all parties. 18 9 Regular use of equitable discretion
would be a more effective deterrent to culpable parties who could not be
certain whether a particular defense would be available.
Congressional action has corrected earlier injustice in margin violation
cases where in pari delicto had been held unavailable. But this only brings
the in pai delicto problem into better focus. The remaining disagreement
over punishment of tippors and tippees emphasizes the need for authoritative
reaffirmation of proceedings "at law or in equity," employing traditional
defenses in the interest of deterrence and fairness.
Finally, just as when the common law defenses are excluded and equitable
discretion is curtailed, congressional intent is again disserved by some courts'
weakening of the explicit "controlling persons" good faith defense in the Acts.
Congress has broad power to alter the common law within constitutional
bounds and although the statutory defense is broadly worded, a substan-
tial burden remains on securities defendants to establish their good faith. For
188. See note 38 and text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
189. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
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these reasons, rulings which exclude the defense or vitiate it by "supplement-
ing" it with common law theories seem patently unwarranted.
The Supreme Court's recent securities decisions may signal a salutary
receptiveness to both common law and statutory defenses. The Court's
decision in Mosinee emphasized the traditional equitable requirements for
obtaining injunctive relief. In Blue Chip the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of statutory language rather than broad policy considerations in its
analysis of a fraud claim. This is in contrast to the Court's earlier securities
acts decisions. The lower courts may adopt a reading of these two cases that
would result in a lessening of the dilution of common law defenses in
securities cases, a greater regard for express statutory provisions, and the
exclusion of common law theories where appropriate. It is submitted that
such a policy would lead to more just and equitable results and better
effectuation of congressional intent in cases arising under the securities acts.
Alice R. Belair
